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“The Source of Learning is Thought”
Reading the Chin-ssu lu (近思錄) with a
“Western Eye”
ROLAND REICHENBACH
Institute of Educational Sciences, University of Zurich
Abstract
The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200)
and Lu¨ Zuqian (1137–1181) and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of
German theories of Bildung (‘self-cultivation’). It aims at demonstrating that among other
insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes
from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life
and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective,
to state that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and
self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of
thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and
corresponding educational policies.
Keywords: Neo-Confucianism, learning, Chin-ssu lu, Confucianist learning
theory, Chu Hsi
Without learning there will be no means
of entering Tao. The efforts in becoming a sage
or a worthy lie completely in learning.
After knowing the road to follow,
and getting in the right direction to advance,
we can speak about learning
(Chu Hsi, 1991, p. 73).
Preliminary Remarks
Among the various insights that today’s readers may gather from Confucian (and
especially Neo-Confucian) literature, one aspect seems to protrude from others: that
learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode
of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated to state that Neo-Confu-
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cian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation
which offers a great opportunity for critical reflections on today’s rather superficial
and instrumentalist understanding of learning.
The influence of Confucian thinking and pertinent concepts has been marginal in
the German history of educational thought. This somewhat contrasts with its impact
on German philosophy, whose exponents—on not so rare occasions, at least—have
referred to the work and life of Confucius. Confucius, according to German philoso-
pher Karl Jaspers, is one of the four most influential human beings in the world his-
tory of thought (cf. Jaspers, 1964). But in contrast to the other three ‘big names’—
Socrates, Buddha, and Jesus—Confucius left written works to posterity. Unfortunately
perhaps, they have not yet been authenticated. Nevertheless, being aware of the
importance of and focus on learning and the idea of self-transformation in Confucian
thinking, it remains more than just surprising that reference to the Chinese tradition
has been rather spare in German thinking (as well as in other European language cul-
tures and educational discourses). Even worse, the superficial image of Confucius is
that of a moralizing father figure whose anecdotes and locutions are collected in little
phrase books suitable as gifts for special social occasions but probably not taken seri-
ously in the academic context—outside the Sinology departments, of course. The
public reception of Confucius—in contrast to Jesus, Buddha, and Socrates—may even
show some clownish streaks. Therefore, the importance of Confucian institutes all
over the world seems obvious.
In the following pages, I will have a look at Neo-Confucian texts as collected by
Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Lu¨ Zuqian (1137–1181).1 It is a modest look from the ‘out-
side’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung (‘self-cultivation’). It is
interesting, on one the hand, to focus on parallels of humanistic concepts of learning
and education while examining the much older thoughts and insights as presented in
the Neo-Confucian texts named above on the other. A crucial difficulty in both cases
is the problem of differentiating between normative and descriptive aspects or state-
ments in Neo-Confucian notions as well as in humanistic concepts of learning and
self-transformation. I will focus on (what I would like to call) the ethos of learning
rather than the role and importance of morality in Confucian thinking (cf. Ivanhoe,
1993) and Zhu Xi’s moral psychology (cf. Shun, 2010). This may occur due to a
(personal) lack of insight, but, by reading the Chin-ssu lu, one might develop the
impression that it is not implausible to reconstruct Neo-Confucian perspectives on
learning (in some respects, at least) by noting the concepts of negativity and negative
morality which border on the ‘aporetic’ style of Socratic thinking (as presented in the
earlier phase of Plato’s work). And it remains striking that Confucius and Socrates
lived at about the same period of time (Socrates 469–399 BC, Confucius 551–479
BC). However, I am unfortunately not in a position to fulfill this interesting task.
Rather I will focus on the idea of ‘learning by thinking’ which demands epistemic
virtues—most of all modesty in evaluating one’s own knowledge, which is an ethos of
learning.
With such a concept (‘ethos’), the problem of the entangling cognitive and ethical
aspects cannot be resolved; I am aware of this, and I know that this is less than what
a ‘pure analytical’ view can accept. Nevertheless, the possible ‘accusation’ (or
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misinterpretation)—according to which Neo-Confucian thoughts on learning are
mainly ways to moralize the topic—can be rejected.
Yet the study of Neo-Confucian texts on learning seems to offer fruitful irritants for
questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in
today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies.
The Chin-ssu lu
The Chin-ssu lu is a collection of Neo-Confucian thoughts on metaphysics, ethics,
reading and literature, and government. It also reflects on Chinese history and its
heterodox systems, Buddhism and Taoism. Wing-Tsit Chan calls the Chin-ssu lu
‘Neo-Confucianism in a nutshell’ and explains: ‘Since it is the forerunner and model
of the Hsing-li ta-ch’u¨an [Great collection of Neo-Confucianism] which was the standard
text covering Chinese thoughts for 500 years, its tremendous influence on Chinese
philosophy can easily be imagined’ (Chin-ssu lu, 1967, ix). Whereas Wang Yang-
ming’s Instructions on the Practical Living represents the major work of the idealistic
wing of Neo-Confucianism, according to Wing-Tsit Chan, the Chin-ssu lu is the major
work of the rationalistic wing of Neo-Confucianism. ‘It is no exaggeration to say (…)’,
he continues, ‘that it has been the most important book in China for the last
750 years’ (ix). Only a fraction of the Neo-Confucian works had been translated into
Western languages up to the 1960’s. The translation of the Chin-ssu lu (to Wing-Tsit
Chan, at least) was ‘imperative’ and ‘long overdue’. The 1967 translation includes
many comments by Chinese, Korean, and Japanese scholars. Another reader on (and
of) Zhu Xi, ‘Further Reflections on Things at Hand’, was published in 1991.
The Chin-ssu lu was written and compiled in 1175 during the Song dynasty (960–
1279), almost 17 centuries after the Lunyu. De Bary writes in ‘Principle and Practical-
ity: Essay in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning’ (edited in 1979 by Theodore de
Bary and Irene Bloom) about the Song dynasty:
Despite their access to power and the benevolent patronage of Song rulers,
the Song Confucians had encountered human limitations in the executing
of their grand designs. (…) Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi), in the twelfth century, read-
justed and reordered his human priorities. The consequence was his intensi-
fication of the effort to articulate Neo-Confucian metaphysics and to
develop a practical system of spiritual and intellectual cultivation, centering
on the ideal of the sage …. (De Bary, 1979, p. 10)
In this process, Neo-Confucianism developed features with strong resemblances to
later European Renaissance and its central topics such as
the dignity of man, the immortality of the soul, and the unity of truth. Each
of these has a close counterpart in the central doctrines of Neo-
Confucianism. Though the second theme is expressed in terms quite differ-
ent from Confucianism, e.g. immortality of the soul, the Neo-Confucians
had a religious or mystical view of the self as united with all creation in such
a way as to transcend its finite limitations. This is found most characteristi-
cally in Neo-Confucian accounts of attaining sage-hood as an experience of
38 Roland Reichenbach
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
ür
ich
] a
t 0
8:5
0 1
3 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
realizing the true self, based on the doctrine that ‘humaneness unites man
with Heaven-and-Earth and all things’. (De Bary, 1979, p. 10–11)
In the Chinese case, de Bary explains, on the one hand, the
reaffirmation of humane values took on a special quality as a reaction
against Buddhism; on the other, certain characteristic features of Neo-
Confucianism showed the influence of Buddhism. The net result, then, was
a humanistic revival which did not so much result in a decline of spirituality
as in a transformation of it. (p. 7)
Be it this or another way, it may seem appropriate to say that this resembles the
Renaissance return to a classical heritage in the eleventh-century revival and
restoration of Confucianism.
East–West comparisons: A Note on Simplistic Dichotomies, and the Request
to Doubt
Also Western non-experts in Confucianism, non-sinologists, and people fully ignorant
of Chinese history and language, may today feel quite comfortable in the lecture on
the Chin-ssu lu, the more rationalistic wing of Neo-Confucianism, which offers striking
resemblances to some aspects of the Bildung idea. The German notion of Bildung is
usually traced back to Eckhart von Hochheim (known as ‘Meister Eckhart’), who
lived from 1260 to 1328 and was quite an influential theologian and philosopher of
the late Middle Age. The concept of Bildung is of theological and spiritual origins, not
mainly a concept of Enlightenment rationality, as it is sometimes interpreted in a
rather reductionist manner.
Whenever it comes to the notion of the self and the notion of rationality, some
authors feel quite tempted to make rather dualistic and simple statements or compar-
isons between Eastern and Western thoughts. This may be to keep things simple. But
it may be politically motivated or derived from pure ignorance, or reflect a desire to
establish certainties in matters of cultural identity and heritage. Whatever the source
or motives may be, such dualistic propositions are not convincing, while being histori-
cally ranked as philosophically untenable. Unfortunately, one comes across many such
simplistic East–West dualisms and dichotomies.2 It’s a wonder how the authors could
develop such ‘great’ overviews and feel so certain that they were capable of comparing
the Confucian tradition with the Western tradition. Doubt, of course, was not invented
by Rene´ Descartes. As we know, it had already played a major role in the Socratic
tradition. One may read in the Chin-ssu lu: ‘The student must first of all know how to
doubt’ (Chin-ssu lu, III, 15, [1967, p. 94]). Neither the Socratic nor the Confucian
tradition is a homogenous body of thought, insights, inspirations, and questions.
Those who enter such a tradition gain a contact with an entire universe, not just a
simple body of anecdotes and phrases. You do not compare universes! If one could
compare universes, one might dispense with doubts and questions. Even worse, one
would not have started to study the universe at all:
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People who do not doubt simply have not been devoted to concrete
practice. If they have concretely practiced, there must be some doubts.
Something must be impracticable, and that raises questions. (Chin-ssu lu,
II, 102, [1967, p. 85])
Commenting on the Confucian tradition, one should be more or less familiar with 18
dynasties and their spiritual, religious, and political circumstances. Comments on
Western thinking may also require pertinent insights into the history of thoughts from
antiquity to postmodern times. But, of course, our lives are too short for such endeav-
ors. We can only comfort ourselves with fragmented insights and get in touch with
the universe of the unknowns. Yet our ambitions should not be too modest:
It is very important that a student should not have a small ambition or to
be flippant. If his ambition is small, he will be easily satisfied. If he is easily
satisfied, there will be no way for him to advance. Being flippant, he will
think that he already knows what he does not yet know and that he has
studied what he has not yet studied. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 111, [1967, p. 87])
In quoting this passage, of course, I implicitly refer not only to Confucius but also to
Socrates. To become educated means to learn what one does not know.
We must try to know what we do not yet know, and to correct what is not
good in us, however little. This is the improvement of our moral nature.
(Chin-ssu lu, II, 94, [1967, p. 83])
Knowing about what one does not know is neither a sign of ignorance nor indifference
but rather the starting point of learning. To make not-knowing explicit is an expres-
sion of thinking and insight. This major feature of a so-called negative pedagogy can
already be found in the Analects (Lunyu) as well as in the Platonic reference to the
aporetic side of Socrates. It remains striking how during the same era (in Greek
antiquity and the Chunqiu dynasty) the figures of Socrates and Confucius articulate
agnostic and negative wisdom—among other similarities (and, of course, important
differences, see, e.g. Tweed & Lehman, 2002).
The Ethos and Love of Learning
A wonderful and well-known passage in the Analects concerns critical students. ‘The
Master said‚ Yan Hui was not any help to me, for he always accepted everything I
said’ (Lun yu¨, XI, 4, Confucius, 1979, p. 106). According to Paul (2006, 2010),
Confucius expresses here that learning becomes more difficult if the learner fails to
contradict or offer criticism—at least from time to time (Paul, 2010, p. 46). Learning
is about thinking. You may be intelligent but not focus on thinking. On the other
hand, you may be not so bright but familiar with the practice of thinking and
studying.3 That is important for self-cultivation, because ‘the source of learning is
thought’ (Chin-ssu lu, III, 6, [1967, p. 90]).
The close connection between learning and thinking requires an effort to look for
expressions that fit personal experiences:
40 Roland Reichenbach
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Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to something that cannot be
expressed in words, we must think it over carefully and sift it clearly again
and again. Only this can be considered skillful learning. As for Kao Tzu,
whenever he came to something that could not be expressed in words, he
would stop and inquire no more. (Chin-ssu lu, III, 22, [1967, p. 97])
Learning, for many students, is naturally no fun at all, and most students want to
avoid the effort to think and learn or agree to learn only if it is smooth and easy. This
is not a new phenomenon:
Nowadays students study like people climbing a hill. As long as the path is
unobstructed and leveled, they take long steps. When they reach a danger-
ous point, they stop right away. The thing to do is to be firm and deter-
mined and proceed with resolution and courage. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 53,
[1967, p. 62])
There is no doubt that students—in this traditional view—can be clearly separated
into at least two groups: students who possess the capacity to struggle and push them-
selves forward, and those who lack this disposition and virtue. ‘Now as for persons
with inferior capacity who wish to pursue learning at leisure and allow it to proceed
wherever it pleases—I have never heard that such a person can succeed’ (Chin-ssu lu,
II, 92, [1967, p. 82]).
It is important to understand that the major motive for learning and thinking in the
Confucian view is a special kind of fondness or love. ‘If someone engages in idle specu-
lation at home, and neither studies nor inquires, then he is already a normal com-
moner. That which gives a sage his sageliness is fondness for learning and inquiry
from inferiors’ (Chu Hsi 1991, p. 73). Learning, and the love of learning, can there-
fore be regarded as a sort of meta-virtue which forms the base and precondition of
self-cultivation. This grand view is already expressed by Confucius himself:
To love benevolence ren(仁) without loving learning is liable to lead to fool-
ishness. To love cleverness without loving learning is liable to lead to devia-
tion from the right path. To love trustworthiness in word without loving
learning is liable to lead to harmful behavior. To love forthrightness without
loving learning is liable to lead to intolerance. To love courage without lov-
ing learning is liable to lead to insubordination. To love unbending strength
without loving learning is liable to lead to indiscipline. (Confucius, 1979,
XVII, 8, pp. 144–145)
Personal dignity, self-respect, and social recognition—in this view—depend less on
achieved skills than on effort (virtues) to change. The language of virtues is richer, for
it includes people’s willingness, desire, and motivation, not just as a necessary drive
to acquire skills or act accordingly but as an inherent feature of human practice.
The ethos of learning is not just a willingness to push oneself forward in an
obsessive way to gather knowledge and skills.
People say we must practice with effort. Such a statement, however, is
superficial. If a person really knows what a thing should be done, he does
The source of learning is thought 41
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
ür
ich
] a
t 0
8:5
0 1
3 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
not need to wait for his will to be aroused. As soon as he artificially arouses
will, that means selfishness. How can such a spirit last long? (Chin-ssu lu,
II, 54, [1967, p. 63])
‘Do what you must’ serves as the maxim and ethos of learning; it stresses being
ambitious without absolutely wanting to reach the target. Therefore, one could seek
the ‘pleasure of learning’ or learning as a form of living.
One who knows learning will surely love it. He who loves it will surely seek
it. And he who seeks it will surely achieve it. The learning of the ancients is
a lifetime affair. If in moments of haste and in times of difficulty or confu-
sion one is devoted to it, how can one fail to achieve it? (Chin-ssu lu, II,
55, [1967, p. 63])
What was said in the section above may remind one—to some degree—of John
Dewey’s a-teleological theory of learning and education, the idea of learning without
focusing on a target outside the process of learning. ‘Master Ming-Tao said: In learn-
ing we must avoid setting up a target. If we go step by step without stop, we will suc-
ceed’ (Chin-ssu lu, II, 74, [1967, p. 69]). In the further notes: Someone asked, ‘In
his endeavor, a student should aim at becoming a sage. Why not set up a target?’ Zhu
Xi answered:
Of course a student should regard a sage as his teacher, but what need is
there to set up a target? As soon as one sets up a target, his mind will be
calculating and deliberating as when he will become a sage and what the
stage of sagehood will be like. Thus from the start in his mind he puts suc-
cess ahead of effort. (…) If every day we compare ourselves with others this
way or that way, it will not do. (…) If one first sets up a target, he will
surely get into the trouble of aiming too high or trying short cuts. (p. 70)
‘In learning’, Zhu Xi says in the Further Reflections on Things at Hand, ‘do not reach
for the clouds or overextend yourself. Simply examine words and deeds, and there is
your reality’ (Chu Hsi 1991, S.74). Ambition and uptightness seem to be regarded as
the enemies of true learning. The intention or even obsession to attain the goal of
sagacity seems to be the perfect way to miss the (implicit) goal.
In the pursuit of learning, if one’s intention is first of all toward accomplish-
ment, he will hurt his learning. With that intention, he will try to bore
through things in violation of principle and to make up things, thus leading
to a lot of trouble. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 106, [1967, p. 85])
And:
The student must devote himself to reality. He should not be attracted to
fame. If he has any desire for fame, he is insincere. The great foundation is
already lost. What is there to be learned? Although devotion to fame and
devotion to profit differ in the degree of impurity, their selfish motivation is
the same. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 62, [1967, p. 67])
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One must move on step by step. This pedagogical insight is so important to Zhu Xi
that his work is called ‘Chin-ssu lu’, meaning something like ‘reflections on things at
hand’: ‘Question: What is meant by reflection on things at hand? Answer: To extend
the basis of similarity in kind’ (Chin-ssu lu, III, 14, [1967, p. 94]).
There is a multifaceted history to tell about developing the canonized work in Con-
fucian thinking and about its transformations—‘de-canonizations’ and ‘re-canoniza-
tions’. The shift veers away from the Five Classics4 to the Four Books in the Song
period, a shift which represents a move toward inwardness (cf. Gardener, 2007, p.
xxii). Zhu Xi (Zhu Xi) as earlier Song literati was mainly interested and attracted to
the Analects, the Mencius, the Great Learning, and Maintaining Perfect Balance (p.
xxiii). A ‘number of the greatest Confucian literati of the Song not only counted
Buddhists among their close acquaintances but themselves had studied Buddhist
teachings’ (…) ‘They were poised for the shift inward’ (ibid.). It is a shift from topics
of community and governance to more general matters of human nature. Could one
call it an anthropological turn?5
Interruption: The Turn to Inwardness (East and West …)
Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) promoted Yan Hui as the true student of Confucius (Hon,
2010, p. 13). By doing this, Zhou ‘redefined learning as an individual quest for culti-
vating the mind’, argued Hon (2010). This turn is also found in ancient Greek philos-
ophy, especially Platonic thinking (Platon, 1993, 1996) and the concept of ‘care for
the self’ (Foucault, 1993; Hadot, 1981, 1996), and in neo-humanistic philosophy
(Humboldt, 1969). Both the Confucian and the Platonic turns to inwardness started
from a political context, the context of human action. As Hon explains:
A learned person, then, is not just a person of action. He is also a person of
the right mind who recognizes the inherent connections among all beings in
this universe. This ‘inward turning is to make cultivation of the heart/mind
the most important part of human learning. (Hon, 2010, p. 13)
This ideal is also found in the humanistic notion of self-cultivation and self-
transformation, for which Wilhelm von Humboldt used the (originally pietistic and
theological) term Bildung (Koller, 1999; Ku¨hne, 1976). It is therefore not a German
specialty or exclusivity, of course (as is sometimes stated in the educational and cul-
tural discourse, especially in Germany [see e.g. Bollenbeck, 1996]). However, one
might not exaggerate to state that the ideal of self-cultivation is a most elaborated and
sophisticated Confucian and Neo-Confucian thought (Wei-ming, 1979), whereas the
concept of the self is much articulated and differentiated in humanistic tradition
(Taylor, 1989).
The German concept of Bildung ‘refers to the inner development of the individual,
a process of fulfillment through education and knowledge, in effect a secular search
for perfection, representing progress and refinement in both knowledge and moral
terms, an amalgam of wisdom and self-realization’ (Watson, 2010, pp. 53–54). It may
be important to consider that the German Enlightenment (Aufkla¨rung) came later in
history than the French, English, and Scottish Enlightenment. The German Aufkla¨rer
The source of learning is thought 43
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
ür
ich
] a
t 0
8:5
0 1
3 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
—‘men of Enlightenment’—could borrow from their neighbors and their earlier
achievements, and they ‘did so selectively, to address problems of specific concern in
German intellectual life’ (Watson, 2010, p. 69).
Enlightenment thought, in general, was characterized by the rise of historicism.
Whereas the idea of societal change was widely accepted in late-seventeenth century
and early eighteenth century Europe, the German Enlightenment focused specifically
on the direction, logic, and meaningfulness of change. Initially, German intellectuals
were fascinated by the French Revolution, though later disgusted by the post-revolu-
tionary terror. This was a remarkable backlash to their hope for political progress.
Without oversimplifying things, one may state that the main difference between the
French and German Enlightenment is a differing understanding of freedom due to
the varying historic experiences before and after the French revolution. Whereas in
the early Western Enlightenment period freedom was understood as an outward, defi-
nitely political concept, in the later German Enlightenment the predominant under-
standing of freedom was characterized by rather an esthetic dimension: not outward
but internal freedom. Even the concept of the so-called Bildungsstaat (‘state/nation of
Bildung’) as proposed by historicist Aufkla¨rer, was mainly an esthetic idea—‘a state
whose main ideal was to enrich the inner life of man’ (Watson, 2010, p. 77). For
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Bildung as ‘education through the humanities’ was ‘the true
path to inner freedom’ (p. 832).
The shift from a political understanding of Enlightenment—like in France,
England, and Scotland—to German inwardness (‘Innerlichkeit’), as realized by the
concept of Bildung, can be interpreted—at least to a certain degree—as a desire of
German intellectuals to escape from a brutal and on the whole disappointing post-
revolutionary world to a place where man could seek secular perfection: an escape
toward inwardness. Therefore, the German concept of humanist Bildung can be criti-
cized as an apolitical ideal in a discourse environment where questions and topics of
political rights, social justice, and societal change were increasingly neglected. That
might be one reason why in history humanist Bildung became entangled later in
Germany with political conservatism and social snobbery (Watson, 2010, p. 834).6
The Effort and Imposition of Studying
The study of the Four Books for boys and young men was surely ‘arduous and not
necessarily intellectually challenging or stimulating’. Most of the time was probably
spent in rote memorization (Gardener, 2007, p. xiii). This was surely necessary in
order to succeed in the first stage of civil service examinations, at the district level,
and to move on to an examination in the provincial capital, and then, after success
there, being qualified to participate at a set of examinations in the imperial capital.
The Four Books ‘were considered sacred texts, for they were the direct words and
teachings of the great sages of antiquity, men whose exemplary wisdom and virtues
served as an eternal model for the ages’ (Gardener, 2007, p. xv). Therefore, one must
consider the significance of these books as of the Bible in the West, its ‘passages,
lines, and terms (…) became part of the lingua franca in China’ (ibid.).
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Even though examination candidates were expected for hundreds of years (at least
from 1300 to 1900) to demonstrate their mastery of the Four Books—the Great Learn-
ing, the Analects, the Mencius, and Maintaining Perfect Balance, as well as Zhu Xi’s
comments on them, we must think of their performances as the results of hard
rote-learning efforts.
Of course, one will find many passages in the Chin-ssu lu which suggest that memo-
rization is maybe necessary but not enough. At the center of educational progress and
perfection lies pre-occupation with the not yet known:
We must try to know what we do not yet know, and to correct what is not
good in us, however little. This is the improvement of our moral nature. In
studying books, search for moral principles. In compiling books, appreciate
what ultimate purposes they have. Do not just copy them. In addition,
know much about words and deeds of former sages and worthies. This is
the improvement of our inquiry and study. Do not relax for a moment.
Keep on like this for three years, and there will be progress. (Chin-ssu lu,
II, 94, [1967, p. 83])
There have been curricular debates, and the specialist can reconstruct rather precisely
which contents were regarded as valuable, improper, or even dangerous during the
very many periods of Confucian thinking:
The learning of the ancients consisted of only one thing, whereas the learn-
ing of today consists of three things, not including the heterodoxial doctri-
nes [meaning Buddhism and Taoism]. The first is literacy composition; the
second, textual criticism; and the third, Confucianism. If one wishes to
advance toward the Way, nothing other than Confucianism will do.
(Chin-ssu lu, II, 56, [1967, p. 63])
To a large extent, the passages on learning in the Chin-ssu lu are about the right atti-
tude of successful learning, the ethos of learning which includes the learner’s confi-
dence, equability, persistence, and, most of all, modesty. The latter can be
experienced in the willingness to learn from people with socially inferior status.
Many people think they are mature and experienced and therefore are not
willing to learn from their inferiors. Consequently they remain ignorant all
their lives. Some people regard themselves as the first ones to know moral
principles and for them there is no such thing as ignorance. Consequently
they too are not willing to learn from inferiors. Because they are never will-
ing to learn, they think of many things that deceive themselves and others.
They are willing to remain ignorant throughout their lives. (Chin-ssu lu, II,
98, [1967, p. 94])
Thinking of oneself as being mature and experienced will be an obstacle for learning
and therefore for moving on in personal development. Even though the ethos of learn-
ing is about moving on step by step, about not being too eager or ambitious, the
proper learner learns as if he or she would want to become a sage.
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Only when people have the will to seek to become sages can we study
together with them. Only when they can study and think carefully can we
proceed with them toward the Way. Only when they can think with success
can we get established in the Way together with them. When they are thor-
oughly transformed with it, we can then weigh events with them, as to
which is standard and which is expedient. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 65, [1967,
p. 67])
The obstacles in moving on, the difficulties in life, are the essential materials for the
possibility of self-transformation. The Chin-ssu lu can be regarded as a very early if not
the earliest document to understand the importance of discontinuity in learning and
the role of discontinuity for personal development.7
Difficulties improve a person because they help him discriminate moral val-
ues carefully and they make his sensitivity greater. This is why Mencius
said, ‘Men who have the wisdom of virtues and the knowledge of skill are
always found to have experienced great difficulties. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 87,
[1967, p. 76])
Great difficulties, also smaller difficulties, of course, put a person in a ‘disequilibrium’
(Piaget, 1957), at least in some ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957); it is striking
how differentiated the insights into these problems and their potential for personal
development are expressed in the Chin-ssu lu. Willingness and effort to find equilib-
rium requires an antecedent state of problem or disequilibrium, of uncertainty and of
a need for a change.
Before one makes up his mind, the trouble is that he has too many ideas
and is uncertain. After he has made up his mind, the trouble is that his
study and cultivation are not refined. Thoughts of study and of cultivation
are all matters of learning. Pursue it diligently. Why get tired of it? One
must lose no time in seeking what is desirable in order to get his mind
established in a position of certainty. Then he can go ahead easily like a
river bursting forth. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 92, [1967, p. 82])
However, the most striking insights Western readers can take from the lecture of the
Chin-ssu lu—at least to me—is something which seems so fundamental and obvious
that it has been underestimated and indeed almost forgotten in today’s pedagogical
and didactical theories: learning is a social matter, not purely individual. The learner
needs another person who shows him something, be it intended or not. The cultiva-
tion of the self is a social matter. Here, it seems, that the Socratic or Platonic idea of
care for the self and the Confucian ideal of self-cultivation seem to share a common
ground; let me say, an amazingly common ground:
In one’s words there should be something to teach others. In one’s activities
there should be something to serve as a model for others. In the morning
something should be done. In the evening something should be realized. At
every moment something should be nourished. And in every instant
something should be preserved. (Chin-ssu lu, II, 88, [1967, p. 76])
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Closing Remarks: Reading the Chin-ssu lu with a ‘Western Eye’
Some familiarity with the discourse of Bildung offers opportunities to detect and
recognize crucial questions and ideas on the importance of learning in the cultivation
of the self as presented in the Chin-ssu lu. During the course of the past two centuries,
there has been a considerable change in the concept of Bildung within the connota-
tional field (Ho¨rster, 1995). Yet the genealogical origins of the concept mentioned
above are in medieval mysticism and pietistic theology. Whereas Bildung in the eigh-
teenth century was closely connected with the idea of ‘humanity’ and ‘perfection’
(concepts such as Enlightenment, bringing virtue and spirit together by the idea of
Bildung), at the end of the nineteenth century Bildung became understood as a com-
modity and a value. Since the mid-twentieth century, during the course of establishing
the social sciences in the broad educational discourse, there have been attempts to
replace the concept of Bildung by concepts such as deculturation, socialization, ego-
identity, development, and qualification. Thus, the concept of Bildung also experi-
enced periods of trivialization and sometimes complete transformation.
The ambiguity and vulnerability of the (original) concept of Bildung have neverthe-
less not resulted in the idea of Bildung having satisfyingly been replaced by surrogates
as suggested by different sides (Pleines, 1989, p. 1). Pleines (1971) suggested that an
attempt to systematize the educational meaning of the Bildung concept is still convinc-
ing today. He knows fully well that a ‘premature determination of its meaning or a
structural reduction of its original meaning will result in its decline and thus in the
leveling of its originally intended contents’ (p. 12). Pleines refers to (1) ‘Bildung as a
valuable commodity which must be strived for’, (2) ‘Bildung as a state of mind’, (3)
‘Bildung as a process of mind’, (4) ‘Bildung as a permanent task’, (5) ‘Bildung as
man’s self-fulfillment in freedom’, and finally pointing out to (6) ‘educated (gebildet)
man and his/her Bildung of reason and heart’ (see pp. 12–38).
The reader of the Chin-ssu lu will detect all these aspects (or comparable ideas, at
least) in this grand collection of texts. The cultivated individual, the learner striving
for self-cultivation, is—in the Confucian tradition—considered as a unity. It might
easily be overseen that the idea of Bildung is not an analytical notion (at least in its
origins), but rather—and similar to the (Neo-) Confucian idea of self-cultivation—Bil-
dung is originally regarded as mediator between the ‘unity of the individual’ and the
‘totality of the world’ (Posner, 1988, p. 26). This mediation is either viewed as a pro-
cess, a state (or goal), or both. The ideals of educational objectives even in today’s
discourses (such as responsibility, independence, self-determination, reasonable prac-
tice, etc.) thus provide the concept of Bildung with its ‘typical dignity’ and make it a
regulative idea of general education and educational theory with ‘a place of normative
understanding within it’ (Miller-Kipp, 1992, pp. 18–19). The constitutive core of the
Bildung idea seems so close to the Confucian ideal of the person learning to care for
oneself on his or her own. In whichever way the term of Bildung is used (as a critical
term for judging practical work or as an ‘uncritical’ term which can be ideologized
and used), what remains as the actual point of reference of the Bildung concept is the
subject as a self-educating individual or an individual under education. Hence, the ‘idea
of the subject’ becomes the ‘systematic core of the concept of Bildung, and the
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question of the subject in the process of Bildung is the fundamental question of
Bildung’ (ibid. p. 19). Thus, educational theory cannot avoid questions concerning
the subject’s constitution—not only in the philosophical sense but also in the psycho-
logical and sociological one.
Despite the ‘blurred’ definition of Bildung, as a ‘universal topic’—if we knew what
that is, after all—Bildung (at least in the German-speaking world)—will stay ‘up to
date’ as long as humans are supposed to be supported and assisted on their way
toward some version of the ideal of self-formation. This also implies certain anthropo-
logic presumptions. The ontological and normative definitions of understanding one-
self and the world will be up to date as long as people consider themselves as ‘self-
interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985) or self-interpreting creatures (Fink, 1970,
p. 193). Any concept of Bildung—or self-cultivation—necessarily transports or reflects
the world views of and images of man. Educational concepts have always been and
are still influenced by the predominant political and cultural situation, which may
result in rather a euphoric and/or elitist educational discourse. For instance, identify-
ing Bildung with a narrow concept of culture, as was common among the German
bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century, understanding it as being different from every-
day matters and civilization, resulted in perceiving a huge gap between ‘Gebildeten’
(educated people) and ‘Ungebildeten’ (uneducated people) or ‘Volk’ (the lower classes)
(Ho¨rster, 1995, pp. 46f).
In mass societies, actually just a few individuals can become educated i.e. according
to the ideals of Greek antiquity. It may be that educational capital understood in this
sense will not have any ‘equalizing’ effect on given social structures if ‘equalization’ is
its essential topic. Despite any individual acquisition of education, the unequal distri-
bution of educational capital or unequal access to education will result in an analo-
gous division along with differentiation lines. Thus, the link will occur by subtle and
less subtle practices of exclusion—as we find in the fields of economic and social capi-
tal (see Bourdieu, 1988).
The Western reader of the Chin-ssu lu may try to reconstruct or interpret the Chin-
ssu lu as a theory of readiness to learn (in the German tradition called Bildsamkeit, cf.
Ku¨hne, 1976). This may be considered a natural pattern. However, this motivational
condition must be cultivated: significant educational efforts will usually aim at self-
education (Bildung). Learning is the most important feature of self-cultivation—this
can be regarded in the Chin-ssu lu as the crucial intuition of implicit virtue ethics.
Learning as self-cultivation and care for the self may be considered a meta-virtue:
the virtue to become virtuous or a better person. This fundamental human motivation
seems to be highly recognized in most cultures—for it appears to be the only way to
escape from indifference, apathy, and despair prevalent in education culture today
(Chin-ssu lu, II, 55, [1967, p. 63]).
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Notes
1. Edited in German by Wolfgang Ommerborn (2008).
2. To give one example: ‘In Western philosophy, the question of “What is the Truth?” has
taken a center stage. However, to the Confucian cultures, this question does not occupy a
central position. The concept of truth is understood differently between the Western and the
Confucian world. In the West, truth is knowledge of reality, basically representations of the
world’ (Kim, 2004, 118).
3. ‘If a person is essentially sharp-witted but does not study, then he is really not sharp-witted’
(Chu Hsi 1991, p. 93).
4. The Classic of Changes (early cosmological views), the Book of Odes (a compilation of over
300 odes, folk songs, ballads, court poetry, dynastic hymns …), the Book of History (a collec-
tion of documents, speeches, and pronouncements on the theme of governance), the Book of
Rites (a compendium of rituals and rules of etiquette), and the Spring and Autumn Annuals
(a chronicle of events in the state of Lu, the native state of Confucius).
5. Without any doubt there is positive pedagogical anthropology in Confucian and Neo-Confucian
thought: ‘Know that human nature is originally good and hold with loyalty and faithfulness
as fundamental. This is the way to build up, first of all, the noble part of your nature’
(Chin-ssu lu, II, 70, [1967, p. 68]). The idea of the good nature of all human beings is, nev-
ertheless, embedded in rather strict conceptions of social conventions. The importance of
good relationships and sensitivity toward status distinctions is crucial: father and son, ruler
and subject, husband and wife, old and young, and friend and friend, according to Mencius,
had become the five paradigmatic relationships binding Chinese society together. In this con-
text, Daniel Gardener has commented or guessed: ‘Perhaps because goodness is relationship
dependent, Confucius himself, although deeply preoccupied with virtue, never provides a
comprehensive definition of it’ (Gardener, 2007, p. 140).
6. The notion of Bildung does not however only refer to the process—as the formation or devel-
opment of a person—but also to the result, the ‘final shape’. Bildung is said to have an ‘ob-
jective’ and a subjective aspect. Whereas the former refers to ‘culture’ (as a philosophical,
scientific, esthetic, moral, in short: ‘reasonable’ interpretation of the world, either referred to
as Allgemeine Menschenbildung [general human education] or as Allgemeinbildung [broad edu-
cational experience]), the latter refers to the specific way of acquiring the objective content
of culture in each case (ibid.). To that extent, we may say that what groups of humans
perceive as culture (ethnicities, nations, communities, etc.) is Bildung at the level of the
individual (von Hentig, 1985, p. 206).
7. This insight will become popular with the Piaget tradition in psychology and pedagogy,
earlier in the work of Herbart, later Dewey (cf. English, 2013).
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